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Engineering Akerlof Lemons: Information
Asymmetry, Externalities, and Market Intervention
in the Genetically Modified Food Market
Kim JoDene Donat"
"I applaud Africa's rejection of genetically modified food... GM
[genetically modified] food should be outlawed throughout the
world. Until it is we should all boycott it... even if we are starv-
ing."
- Peter (U.S.A.) - Comment from a BBC Internet discussion
considering whether southern Africa should accept geneti-
cally modified food aid.'
"Don't worry about what I feed my family. You just give me some
money and I will take care of it. You don't have to assume that I
don't know what to feed my family. The problem is that I hap-
pen to be poor, and if you can't do anything about that then get
out of here. Don't waste my time."
- Farmer, Bangladesh, early 1980's'
INTRODUCTION
Famine threatened an estimated 14.4 million people in
southern Africa between September 2002 and March 2003.'
* J.D./M.P.P. candidate, 2004, University of Minnesota. The author would like
to thank Tom Cooney, BCL, LLM, lecturer at University College Dublin, for his
work on developing a human rights test to help policymakers evaluate public health
legislation.
1. Should Southern Africa Accept GM Food Aid?, BBC NEWS, July 30, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ (on file with author).
2. Florence McCarthy, The Target Group: Women in Rural Bangladesh, in
ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE: AN EXPLORATION OF PUBLIC POLICY PLANNING IN
AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 49-58 (E.J. Clay & B.B. Schaffer eds.,
1984).
3. On September 16, 2002, the Southern African Development Community's
Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Vulnerability Committee (SADC FANR)
estimated that the maximum number of people in need between September 1, 2002,
and March 31, 2003, would be 14.4 million. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., SOUTHERN
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Food aid from the United States could help ameliorate this cri-
sis.4 A few countries, however, have declined the food offered or
have accepted it under limited conditions because it cannot be
certified as free of genetic modification.5
This recent controversy in southern Africa, regarding ge-
netically modified food (GMOs),6 is symptomatic of the broader
trade impasse over GMOs between the United States and the
European Union (EU).7 GMOs are no longer only a trade issue
for the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but GMOs have also
become an issue of humanitarian aid and international human
rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights,s the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, and the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.' °
The GMO market is failing for several reasons, including:
(1) information asymmetry and the economic phenomena known
AFRICA - COMPLEX FOOD SECURITY CRISIS SITUATION REPORT #1 (FY) 2003 (Oct. 4,
2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/ofda/southernafrica srlfy03.html [herein-
after U.S. AID].
4. The United States pledged to give fifty percent of the World Food Pro-
gramme's commitment. The European Union committed to twenty percent. Andrew
S. Natsios, The Food Crisis in Southern Africa: The Challenge to Sustainability,
Briefing at the Foreign Press Center (Aug. 20, 2002), available at http:l!
fpc.state.gov/12853.htm.
5. Zimbabwe Reconsiders GM Grain, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2002, at
http:/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2167860.stm. Zimbabwe originally announced it
would refuse the grain but then reversed its decision. Id. Zambia's President an-
nounced that GMOs would be examined for safety before distribution. Id. Mozam-
bique, which acts as a pass-through in transit for food to Malawi and Zimbabwe,
asked the World Food Programme to cover the grain in plastic sheeting to avoid
spillage, which might contaminate their crops. Id. Malawi said it had no choice but
to accept the food. Id.; see also Zimbabwe Turns Away US Food Aid, BBC NEWS,
May 31, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2019052.stm (announcing the dec-
lination of food aid).
6. Although the author has used the more typical abbreviation GMO that
means genetically modified organism, the context of this article is limited to plant
food and does not address the subject of genetic modification of animals or humans.
7. See supra note 5.
8. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR].
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 183d plen. mtg., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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as the "lemon problem;"" (2) the presence of environmental and
biological externalities which may not be reflected in the price of
the product;12 and (3) the western bias of intellectual property
rights, which seriously disadvantages the long history of agri-
cultural production in developing economies. 3 These shortcom-
ings and the resulting trade impasse between the United States
and the EU highlight the problem of equity and efficiency in the
GMO market."
This Note will discuss the economic failure in the GMO
market and argue that the creation of a human rights test to
judge GMO market regulation is an appropriate tool to gauge
necessary market interventions. Part I defines GMOs and iden-
tifies GMO benefits and concerns. Part II examines the conflict
between the United States and the EU and how it has affected
the provision of food aid in less developed countries. Part III
discusses three types of market failure in the GMO market.
Part IV describes the internationally recognized right to food.
Finally, Part V promotes the right to food by applying a human
rights test to necessary economic intervention.
I. THE CONFLICT SURROUNDING GENETICALLY
MODIFIED FOOD
A. DEFINING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
The debate regarding GMOs developed when biotechnology
created ways for scientists to fuse genes on a cellular level.1"
Even though the regulatory or legal definitions of GMOs are in-
consistent internationally, this Note adopts the definition that
genetically modified food is food that has been created through a
biotechnological process" "to isolate genes from an organism,
11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.
13. See discussion infra Part III.C.
14. See discussion infra Part III.C.
15. See Jeffrey K. Francer, Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating
Agricultural Biotechnology in the United States and European Union, 7 VA. J. Soc.
POLVY & L. 257, 261-62 (2000); ROBERT L. PAARLBERG, GOVERNING THE GM CROP
REVOLUTION: POLICY CHOICES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (Food, Agriculture,
and the Environment, Discussion Paper No. 33, Dec. 2000). Genetic engineering
technology developed in 1973, but the modern commercial GM crop revolution did
not begin until 1995. PAARLBERG, supra, at 1.
16. In this Note, the terms genetic engineering, genetic modification, and bio-
technology are used interchangeably.
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manipulate them in the laboratory and inject them into another
organism." 7
Differences between the EU and U.S. definitions of geneti-
cally modified food are the genesis of the controversy between
the two bodies regarding the regulation and labeling of GMO
food. The U.S. regulatory scheme does not contemplate a differ-
ence between "new" genetically modified food, modified through
biotechnology, and food produced from hybridization 8 or other
traditional methods of genetic modification, 9 and uses the term
"genetically modified" food to encompass both processes." The
EU, however, considers non-traditional methods of modification,
such as those which occur in a laboratory, as suspect. It re-
serves the term "genetically modified" for food and food ingredi-
ents which are modified in the laboratory, contain genetically
modified material, or are produced from "parent" GMOs.2 In
the EU, foods produced from genetically "injected" or genetically
modified seed are subject to heightened scrutiny.2  The EU
Regulation on Novel Foods and Food Ingredients states that
foods must be labeled when they are no longer "equivalent" to
their conventional counterparts.23 The EU views the laboratory
method of gene "injection" as inherently suspect, so any food
17. Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the
United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525, 535 n.48
(1998) (citing ORG. ON ECON. AND CMTY. DEV., BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE AND
FOOD 211 (1992)).
18. Biotechnology includes traditional animal and plant breeding techniques,
such as hybridization and the selection of plants and animals with specific charac-
teristics to create, for example, crops which produce higher yields of grain. Francer,
supra note 15, at 261-62; CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, Frequently Asked
Questions about the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, at http://www.biodiv.org/bio
safety/faqs.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
19. Biotechnology, in the form of traditional fermentation techniques, has been
used for decades to make bread, cheese, and beer. See Francer, supra note 15, at
261-62.
20. George E.C. York, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New
Legal Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 426
(2001). For example, the U.S. regulatory scheme does not contemplate any differ-
ence between an apple produced from seeds that have been "injected" with a gene in
a laboratory to make the apple taste sour, and an apple produced through hybridiza-
tion in an orchard through cross-pollination, seed selection, or other non-laboratory
methods to make it taste sour. Both have been genetically modified from the natu-
ral state: one with historic methods and the other with new laboratory methods. Id.
21. Council Regulation 258/97 on Novel Foods and Food Ingredients, art. 1,
1997 O.J. (L 43) 5 [hereinafter Novel Foods Regulation].
22. See id.
23. Id. at art. 8. For example, this might occur when a food has a different
composition, use or nutritional value as compared to the conventional food. Id.
[Vo1.12:2
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that has undergone this process is no longer "equivalent" and,
therefore is subject to the novel foods regulation regime.24
B. BENEFITS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
The potential benefits of genetically modified foods are nu-
merous.2 1 Many varieties of GM seed currently on the market
have been promulgated because they decrease agricultural in-
puts26 or increase yields.2" Some of the nutritional benefits that
scientists promise include foods that are richer in vitamins,28
minerals, or protein, or lower in fat,29 making it easier to choose
24. See id. at art. 1. Any food, "with a new or intentionally modified primary
molecular structure" is subject to the regulation. Id.
25. Over 500 scientists wrote the following in a letter supporting biotechnology:
In developing countries, biotechnology advances will provide the means to
overcome vitamin deficiencies, to supply vaccines for killer diseases, like
cholera and malaria, to increase production and protect fragile natural re-
sources, and to grow crops under normally unfavorable conditions ....
When there is no credible evidence of a risk to human health from use of
biotechnology, why would anyone want to deny the world these benefits?
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
BIOTECHNOLOGY (Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/
1142.htm.
26. York, supra note 20, at 430-31. Bt, or bacillus thuringeinsis, cotton pro-
vides one example of the environmental benefits of biotechnology, which are already
being enjoyed in the United States. Id. While Bt cotton grown in California re-
quires only one application of chemical insecticide per season instead of the former
thirteen, Arizona farmers have reduced their use of insecticides by seventy-five per-
cent. Id; see also Charles W. Smitherman III, World Trade Organization Adjudica-
tion of the European Union-United States Dispute Over the Moratorium on the In-
troduction of New Genetically Modified Foods to the European Common Market: A
Hypothetical Opinion of the Dispute Panel, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 475, 480-81
(2002).
27. See York, supra note 20, at 429.
For example Bt corn, which incorporates the genes of a soil microbe which
is toxic to corn-damaging insects but safe for humans, animals, and other
plants, has increased its yield by more than 66 million bushels in 1999 and
has also led to modest decreases in insecticide use. Moreover, while studies
have shown that certain types of GM wheat are expected to lead to an in-
crease in yield potential of ten to fifteen percent, the World Bank has re-
ported that biotechnology promises to increase food productivity in the de-
veloping world by twenty-five percent.
Id.
28. For example, "a new rice variety [golden rice] developed in Switzerland un-
der a Rockefeller Foundation grant provides vitamin A. Each year nearly [one] mil-
lion child deaths and [fourteen] million children with blindness and other eye prob-
lems have been linked to vitamin A deficiency." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 25.
29. A potato with higher starch content would soak up less oil when it was
fried, thereby reducing the fat content in french fries and potato chips. See CRAIG
DONNELLAN, GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 4 (2000).
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a healthy diet. " GMOs also enhance marketability through im-
proved preservation of fruits and vegetables.31  Furthermore,
farmers enjoy the benefit of crops that are able to resist bacte-
rial and viral disease, insect attacks,32 drought, and frost.33 Bio-
technology also provides for quicker diagnosis of diseases in
plants and animals.34 Finally, herbicide-tolerant crops require
less herbicide, 5 and nitrogen-fixing, self-fertilizing cereal crops 6
require less chemical fertilizer. Together these benefits should
lead to improved quality and quantity of foods and increased
availability to people throughout the world.37
Commercial seed companies use the tool of biotechnology,
instead of more traditional hybridization methods for three
main reasons. First, genetic engineering increases the accuracy
of targeting a specific, desirable trait in a plant, whereas hybrid
results are less accurate and some less desirable traits might
need to be tolerated in order to pursue the targeted trait.3" Sec-
ond, genetic engineering increases the speed of the promulga-
tion of a certain desired trait.3 9  Third, genetic engineering
30. Id. at 3-5.
31. The Flavr Savr@ tomato was the first genetically modified food released in
the United States. Genetic modification removed the gene that produces the enzyme
that causes tomatoes to soften. York, supra note 20, at 429. This meant that toma-
toes could be shipped while firm, decreasing product loss due to softness, as well as
increasing shelf life. DONNELLAN, supra note 29, at 4; York, supra note 20, at 426,
429.
32. See York, supra note 20, at 431. Bt cotton was engineered to be resistant to
insects. However, the pink bullworm, a significant threat to cotton plants, has not
developed resistance to the Bt gene. Id.
33. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
34. Biotechnology test kits have been developed which can help farmers test
crops to determine when pests or diseases are plaguing their crops, so they can take
appropriate measures. See DONNELLAN, supra note 29, at 4-5.
35. See id. at 3-4.
36. Scientists are trying to engineer the natural nitrogen-fixing trait of beans
into cereal crops, which lack nitrogen fixing-capabilities, with the hope that the ce-
real crops will become "self-fertilizing" and that less non-organic, high nitrate fertil-
izer will have to be applied. See id. at 4-5.
37. See York, supra note 20, at 429. "The World Bank has reported that bio-
technology promises to increase food productivity in the developing world by twenty-
five percent." Id. However, the actual impact of GMO crops on pesticide use, yields,
and net returns will vary with the crop and technology examined. See Jorge Fer-
nandez-Cornejo & William D. McBride, Genetically Engineered Crops for Pest Man-
agement in U.S. Agriculture: Farm-Level Effects, 786 AGRIC. ECON. REP. 187 (2000),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer786.
38. See ISMAIL SERAGELDIN & G.J. PERSLEY, CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, PROMETHEAN SCIENCE: AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE POOR 19 (2000).
39. Hybridization is a process where seeds are selected and crossbred to arrive
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makes possible genetic coding that could not occur in the natu-
ral environment." These three reasons translate into increased
profit because the seed and product generated can carry a pre-
mium price.4 This premium and the increased profit it repre-
sents are why multinational corporations are at the forefront of
this research and development.42
C. CONCERNS ABOUT GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
Genetic modification of food products is a technology that
has leapt from the lab to the commercial market. Consequently,
consumers and policymakers have environmental, health, ethi-
cal, and legal concerns about the consumption of GMOs and the
planting of GM seed.43
1. Environmental Concerns
Conservationists are concerned about the use of human and
animal genetic material in plants for environmental reasons, in-
cluding the creation of invasive non-native species and the de-
struction of plant and animal species. One concern is that cop-
ied genes incorporated into a plant could "escape" and transfer
to another species with undesirable consequences.44 For exam-
ple, ecologists argue that genetically modified crops could cross-
pollinate with weeds and create "super-weeds. ""
at the desired balance of favorable traits. JOHAN POTTIER, ANTHROPOLOGY OF FOOD:
THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FOOD SECURITY 124-26 (1999). Genetic engineering es-
sentially does this in a Petri dish more accurately and faster than nature. Id.
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 25. One example of cross breeding
which would not occur in nature is the creation of frost resistant tomatoes by "inject-
ing" DNA from cold water fish into the genetic makeup of the plant. James Acton,
Genetically Modified Food, DEBATABASE (June 30, 2000), at http://www.debatabase.
org/debatabase/details-pr.asp?topicID=12.
41. See SERAGELDIN & PERSLEY, supra note 38, at 19-21.
42. See DONNELLAN, supra note 29, at 5-6.
43. Id. at 5-7.
44. See York, supra note 20, at 433.
45. Id. at 433-34; James King, Could Transgenic Supercorps One Day Breed
Superweeds?, 274 SCIENCE 180, 180-81 (1996); Press Release, Food and Agricultural
Organization, Biotechnology Can Help Feed an Increasing World Population - Posi-
tive and Negative Aspects Need to Be Balanced (Jan. 21, 1999), at www.fao.org/
waicent/ois/press/presseng/1999/pren9902.htm. Several studies have shown that
gene flow from GMOs to wild varieties does occur. King, supra, at 180. Agricultural
officials say that the dangers of creating a super weed are, "at the moment hypo-
thetical," and point out that: (1) most GMO crops do not have weedy native relatives
with which they could hybridize; (2) most sought after traits do not give weedy rela-
tives a comparative advantage; and (3) herbicide companies have an economic inter-
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Another concern is that GMOs decrease the gene pool. 46 De-
creases in the gene pool are anticipated because GMOs may
promote monocroping, which is the practice of relying on a lim-
ited number of commercial seeds and thereby eroding local va-
rieties of crops.4 As plant species are lost, the community ethos
and knowledge that sustained them are also lost, making revi-
talization of species unlikely. 4s Together these problems indi-
cate that a decreasingly small gene pool puts the world at risk of
plant and animal species extinction.45
est in assuring that resistance to a herbicide does not build up in weeds. Id. at 180-
81. Skeptics hypothesize that although gene transfer may only be likely in one per-
cent of products, with the number of plants being introduced, a moderate to large
scale ecological or economic catastrophe in the next ten years is likely. Id. at 180.
46. One solution to this is the creation of germ plasma banks, which are reposi-
tories in which germ plasma is protected for future use. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.,
AGENDA 21, CH. 14 (G) PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT: CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE UTILIZATION OF PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES AND FOR FOOD AND SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE paras. 14.54-14.55, at
http://www.fao.orgWAICENT/FaoInfo/Agricult/AGP/AGPS/pgrfa/pdf/ag2le.pdf (last
visited Mar. 14, 2003); FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR PLANT GERMPLASM COLLECTING AND TRANSFER art. 1, at http://www.fao.org/
WAICENT/FaoInfo/AgricultAGP/AGPS/pgr/icc/icce.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
Germ plasma simply refers to the genetic material, which makes up the traits of any
given plant or animal. Id. at art. 2. These banks have received mixed reviews as to
their effectiveness. Id.
47. During the Green Revolution, decreases in the gene pool were attributed to
a development strategy that encouraged monocropping, though it did not include
GMO technology. See Gilbert Etienne, Overcoming Rural Poverty: The Lessons of
Asia, in THE GEOPOLITICS OF HUNGER, 2000-2001: HUNGER AND POWER, 259, 259-61
(Action Against Hunger ed., 2001) (describing the Green Revolution and its out-
comes). For example, in Zimbabwe after the Green Revolution, two hybrid varieties
account for ninety percent of all maize planted. POTTIER, supra note 39, at 126. "In
an interview in Buhera District, Zimbabwe (September 1993), elders stressed that
traditional crops, especially fingermillet (rapoko), were declining because local farm-
ers now looked down upon them. 'For these modern farmers, rapoko seed is like shoe
polish', one elder said." Id. (citation omitted).
48. POTTIER, supra note 39, at 126.
49. First, planting multi-plant varieties protects populations from plagues that
might destroy one variety of plant but not affect another. See Hctor Sdez, Property
Rights, Technology, and Land Degradation: A Case Study of Santo Domingo Cuba,
CUBA IN TRANSITION 472 (Aug. 7-9, 1997), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/
la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba7/saez.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). Second, plant or genetic
trait loss may mean the loss of important medicines or other commercially useful
properties that the market has not yet exploited. See Mark J. Plotkin, Bioprospect-
ing: Medicine Quest: Interview with Mark J. Plotkin, Ph.D., at http://www.actionbio
science.org/biodiversity/plotkin.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). Third, selection of
certain traits might breed out other traits. Interview with Jorge Bentancourt, Agri-
cultural Program Director, Peace Corps Honduras, in Honduras (June-Aug. 1998)
(describing monocropping during the Green Revolution in Honduras, but the same
effect would likely occur with GMO-inspired monocropping).
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2. Health Concerns
Moreover, public health specialists and consumer groups
are concerned about the use of human and animal genetic mate-
rial in plants for public health reasons. 50 However, medical and
scientific evidence has shown no ill health effects from ingesting
genetically modified food. While there are additional concerns
about collateral effects from what is being injected, there are
feasible means to address them. For instance, some fear reac-
tions to allergens or toxins transferred into the food from the
genetic process or the genetic plasma taken. 2 Allergic reactions,
however, have only been noted in clinical trials and can be
remedied through proper labeling.53 Therefore, this public
health concern can be easily overcome.
Other health specialists fear an increasing human resis-
tance to antibodies because of an antibiotic marker that is in-
cluded in many GMOs. 4 Scientists use an antibody to "mark"
the gene trait that they wish to transfer. 5 This antibody is then
carried into the new organism as part of its genetic makeup and
is eventually consumed.56 Antibiotics are commonly prescribed
as medicine to ward off infection but a resistance can be devel-
oped that renders the drugs ineffective if they are used too of-
ten.57 There is public concern that the antibiotic markers in
food, consumed over a lifetime, will contribute to a decrease in
the effectiveness of antibodies prescribed for medicinal pur-
poses.58 To combat this concern, sugar-based markers are al-
50. See infra notes 52, 58 and accompanying text.
51. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 25.
52. York, supra note 20, at 433. In a laboratory test it was shown that people
who are allergic to nuts may have a reaction to a food which has been modified with
genes from Brazilian nuts. WILLIAM K. HALLMAN, CONSUMER CONCERNS ABOUT
BIOTECHNOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 7 (2000) (citing J.A. Nordlee et al.,
Identification of a Brazil-Nut Allergen in Transgenic Soybeans, 334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 688-692 (1996)).
53. Id.
54. SERAGELDIN & PERSLEY, supra note 38, at 19 (discussing a new sugar-
based marker that can replace the antibiotic marker currently being used).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Anthony C. LoBaido, 'Frankenfoods' Create Furor on Dark Continent: De-
spite Safety Concerns, ANC Government Embraces Altered Crops, WORLDNETDAILY
(Oct. 10, 2002), at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=
29227.
58. See EC Regulation of Genetic Modification in Agriculture, Proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 90/220/EEC on the
Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, Ques-
tioning before the Select Comm. on Eur. Communities of the U.K. House of Lords
20031
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ready being tested to possibly replace the antibiotic markers. 9
The introduction of sugar-based markers in the place of antibi-
otic markers would leave public health concerns largely unsup-
ported by scientific evidence.
3. Legal and Economic Concerns
Additionally, GMOs spark legal and economic concerns for
multinational corporations, economic-rights groups, and anti-
globalization activists. Multinational corporations are con-
cerned with recapturing their research and development cost
through intellectual property protection. ° It is these multina-
tional corporations, not states or development agencies, which
largely drive GMO research and development."'
On the other hand, economic rights and anti-globalization
activists are concerned that increasing reliance on western-
controlled technologies will damage developing world farmers.
People working in agriculture development worry that large
corporate farmers, the consumers of large multinational corpo-
rations that produce GMOs, will receive all the benefits and that
the interests of farmers in lesser-developed countries (LDCs)
will not be protected.62 This problem has already surfaced as
patents are already being issued to western companies for prod-
ucts that farmers in LDCs have been cultivating for centuries,
but have not yet patented.63
4. Ethical and Religious Concerns
Furthermore, some consumers are concerned about the use
of human and animal genetic material in plants for ethical and
religious reasons. Religious leaders convened in the United
Kingdom in 1993 to discuss the use of this biotechnology in light
(July 8, 1998) (question 421 from Lord Rathcavan to Timothy Galvin, Assoc. Admin-
istrator, Foreign Agric. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric.), available at http://www.parlia
ment.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/ldeucom/11/8070805.htm.
59. SERAGELDIN & PERSLEY, supra note 38, at 19.
60. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(IPRs) ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at http://www.fao.
org/biotech/C6doc.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
61. HALLMAN, supra note 52, at 6.
62. POTTIER, supra note 39, at 184.
63. Id. at 188. Anthropologist Vandana Shiva said this "represents an attempt
to steal both from nature and the farmers who have nurtured basmati for centuries,
as well as to sell counterfeit food to the consumer." Id. at 184-85.
426 [Vo1.12:2
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of religious dietary restrictions.64 Christian and Jewish groups
generally found the use acceptable, but Muslims, Sikhs, and
Hindus objected to the use of genetic material from prohibited
animals being introduced into plants.65 Vegetarians also ob-
jected to animal proteins being introduced into plant material.66
II. REGULATORY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
The market friction between the EU and the United States
stems from the different approaches used by each region to de-
fine, test, and label new crop varieties.67 The U.S. definition of
GMOs is product rather than process centered. Defining GMOs
by product rather than by process means that the regulatory
scheme does not contemplate a difference between genetic engi-
neering and traditional methods of hybridization. 6 As a result,
in screening GM crop technologies for food safety and biosafety
risks, the United States uses methods similar to those employed
for conventional crops.6 9 This approach is called the "permissive
strategy."
70
Governments in Europe initially followed suit, adopting the
"permissive strategy" until they encountered strong social resis-
tance from a coalition of anti-GMO groups.7' The EU then in-
voked its right to take protectionist measures to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of its people because of a lack of full
scientific certainty regarding the environmental safety of ge-
netically modified products.72 This new approach is commonly
referred to as the "precautionary approach.""
64. DONNELLAN, supra note 29, at 7.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The GM food conflict is not limited to the United States and the EU. Can-
ada, Australia, and other countries produce significant amounts of genetically modi-
fied crops. The conflict with the United States is highlighted because of its role in
the donation of food to southern African states and how specifically the U.S./EU con-
flict impeded such an exchange. See discussion infra notes 78-85.
68. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
69. PAARLBERG, supra note 15, at 2. Argentina and Canada followed this ap-
proach. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Coalition consisted of consumer groups, Green Party leaders, or-
ganic farmers, environmental organizations, and opponents of international seed
companies. Id.
72. See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
73. PAARLBERG, supra note 15, at 2. The EU and consumer and environmental
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A. THE PERMISSIVE STRATEGY
The United States has based its regulatory scheme on the
permissive strategy.74 That is, as long as the product is substan-
tially equivalent to the traditional product, differences in the
processes used to achieve that result are not considered.75
Therefore, no special labeling or commodity segregation is re-
quired if the modified product passes the safety test used on
traditional products."
This regulation is not administered under a centralized au-
thority but rather falls within the combined authority of the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Under this regulatory framework, USDA's Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) ensures that
new GMO varieties are as safe to use in agriculture as conven-
tional varieties. 7 The FDA consults with developers of GMOs to
ensure that the new crops and foods produced from them are as
safe to consume as conventional foods. 78 Finally, the EPA pro-
tects public health and the environment from plants with pesti-
cidal properties and GMOs by conducting scientific reviews.'9
B. THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH
The precautionary approach, which was first pronounced in
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment,so is invoked in those circumstances where science might
get ahead of appropriate health and environmental regulations.
Principle 15 states that "in order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be applied by States... [w]here
groups cannot base the precautionary approach on the balance of scientific evidence.
They had no scientific evidence that any GM food or crops on the market
were any less safe for human consumption or for the environment than the
corresponding conventional foods and crops. Yet the novelty of the GM
process seemed to suggest that conventional food safety and biosafety
screening procedures were no longer adequate for judging possible risks.
Id.
74. York, supra note 20, at 426.
75. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, Food and
Drug Administration, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, at 22,984 n.3 (1992).
76. PAARLBERG, supra note 15, at 2.
77. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 25.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex I, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.125/126 (1992).
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there are threats of serious or irreversible damage," with the
proviso that "lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation.""'
The EU precautionary approach defines genetic modifica-
tion based on the process rather than the product. The EU does
not presume that genetic engineering is an inherently safe proc-
ess; therefore, it distinguishes between modifications made by
traditional methods, which it considers safe, and modifications
using modern biotechnology techniques.82 The EU system
deems any product processed with modern biotechnology tech-
niques suspect and subjects it to strict labeling requirements."
Furthermore, new GM foods or food products are also subject to
the EU's current moratorium on GMO food.84
Council directives administer the use of GMOs in the EU.
Directives 90/119 and 90/200 govern the release of GMOs in the
EU and Directive 90/220 demands that researchers conduct an
environmental risk assessment before release of a GMO. 85 Ex-
tensive field testing is then required before a product can be
marketed.86  Additionally, producers must receive government
consent from each member state before marketing can proceed.87
Currently, however, the EU has invoked its privileges under the
precautionary approach to enforce a de facto moratorium on the
release and sale of all GMOs not already approved.88
The EU abandoned the permissive strategy for the precau-
tionary approach when constituents voiced concerns over the
environmental and health safety of GMOs, despite the absence
81. Id.
82. See York, supra note 20, at 443.
83. According to Article 8.1(a) of Regulation 258/97, consumers must be in-
formed of the modifications and methods of modification when a GMO is "no longer
equivalent." Id. at 452. A GMO is no longer equivalent if the modifications are such
that they are beyond the "accepted limits of natural variations for such characteris-
tics." Id. at 453 (citing the Novel Foods Regulation). More recently, EU Directive
1139/98 demands "mandatory labeling of novel food products containing more than
one percent engineered DNA or protein content (and insinuated associated food
safety risks based on the 'precautionary principle')." ADVISORY COMM. ON INT'L
ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 24 (ACIEP, Briefing Paper for the June 13, 2000
meeting).
84. See generally Smitherman, supra note 26; see also infra Part II.C. (discuss-
ing the cost and nature of the moratorium).
85. Council Directive 90/119/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1; Council Directive
90/220/EEC, pmbl. & art. 5, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15.
86. Council Directive 90/220/EEC, supra note 85, at arts. 11.1, 15, 16.
87. Id. at art. 6.4.
88. York, supra note 20, at 428.
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of scientific evidence to support such concerns. s9 European con-
sumers have voiced a high level of concern over GMOs and food
safety issues.90 The strong Green Party presence in Europe
backed the precautionary approach." In addition, research on
consumer attitudes suggests that the 1996 mad cow disease cri-
sis helped to organize the support of consumer groups. s2 Farm
Unions also joined the Greens and consumer groups, citing con-
cerns over food safety and quality and, arguably, hoping for pro-
tectionist policies against a U.S. advantage in the GMO mar-
ket.93 Environmentalists were also apprehensive and joined the
Green Party, consumers, and the farm union coalition, to push
the EU towards a precautionary approach. 9' In 1997, the coali-
tion demanded a labeling regime for GMOs. 95 A year later, in
1998, the EU blocked the registration of any new varieties of
89. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
90. See HALLMAN, supra note 52, at 5-6. Some commentators also feel that
media reporting differences between the United States and the EU has played a
hand in galvanizing peoples' stance on the GM food issue. Id. When the scientific
world announced the successful cloning of a sheep, U.S. media sources generally
lauded the scientific accomplishment while EU sources more often reported the story
from a legal, ethical, and moral side. Id. at 4.
91. York, supra note 20, at 446.
92. See HALLMAN, supra note 52, at 6 (citing B. Holmes, The Great Divide:
What Do Americans Make of the Furor Engulfing Britain?, 161 NEW SCI. 1, 6-7
(1999); R. Horton, Genetically Modified Foods: "Absurd Concern or Welcome Dia-
logue?," 354 LANCET 1314, 1314-15 (1999)). Mad Cow disease led to the destruction
of millions of cows infected with a brain-eating parasite, which caused chronic brain
wasting disease in some people who ate the meat. See CNN.COM, Mad Cow Disease:
Counting the Cost, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/madcow/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2003). Over 188,000 cases of mad cow disease have been reported, includ-
ing one hundred deaths from vCJD, the related chronic wasting disease. Most of
these have occurred in the United Kingdom. CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE
FOUNDATION, INC., CJD INFO, at http://cjdfoundation.org/CJDInfo.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2003); see also CNN.COM, Timeline: How the Crisis Unfolded, Jan. 15, 2001,
at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europelUK/10/25/bse.timeline/index.html (out-
lining the genesis and development of the mad cow disease crisis and its subsequent
spread to different parts of the European Union and the world). In considering the
heightened anxiety over GM foods in the EU, it is interesting to note that mad cow
disease was incorrectly attributed to "the addition of hormones in cattle feed" by
49.2% of Europeans. EUROPEAN COMM'N RESEARCH DIRECTORATE-GEN., EURO-
BAROMETER 55.2: EUROPEANS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/commpublic-opinion/archives/eb/ebs_154_en.pdf. The disease is
actually linked to the presence of infected sheep meat in the diets of cattle, not
GMOs or hormones. See York, supra note 20, at 446.
93. PAARLBERG, supra note 15, at 2. European agriculture has been subsidized
heavily since World War II. Id. This protectionism has been a source of conflict





C. THE EU MORATORIUM ON U.S. GENETICALLY MODIFIED
IMPORTS
The impasse between the passive approach and the precau-
tionary approach has created an effective moratorium costing
the United States over $600 million in lost trade.97 Some com-
mentators argue that such a moratorium breaches the EU's ob-
ligations as a member of the WTO.9" Regardless of whether the
effective moratorium is a breach, the standoff between the
United States and the EU is not only affecting trade between
the two regions, but is also impeding the delivery of food aid to
countries in Africa.99
D. THE TREATIES AT THE SOURCE OF THE CONFLICT
Both the United States and the EU are members of the
WTO and are subject to the limitations set forth in GATT. 00
The WTO and GATT were established to promote free and open
trade."' This purpose, however, is subject to the domestic right
to "protect and preserve the environment." 2 The WTO and
GATT provide standards meant to protect the environment and
regulate biotechnology, including Article XX of GATT, 103 the
WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS),04 and the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB)."'
96. Id.
97. Smitherman, supra note 26, at 475.
98. See id. for a hypothetical ruling of the WTO on this matter.
99. See infra notes 1298-29 and accompanying text.
100. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
Final Act]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
101. GATT, supra note 100, at pmbl.
102. Id.
103. Id. at art. XX.
104. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/
spsagr e.htm [hereinafter SPS].
105. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000) [hereinafter CPB].
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1. Article XX of GATT
Article XX of GATT allows for municipal law to circumvent
the normal trading rules of the GATT/WTO in certain circum-
stances. 106 Municipal law may circumvent normal trade rules "if
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." °7
GATT prohibits such municipal laws from circumventing nor-
mal trading rules if the laws are "[1] arbitrary, [2] unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or [3] a disguised restriction on international trade."'
2. The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
The SPS °9 applies to measures that may affect interna-
tional trade in animals and plants." ° The SPS recognizes the
right of member states to enforce measures necessary for the
protection of human, animal, and plant life or health, however,
the SPS states that such measures must be based on scientific
principles and sufficient scientific evidence."' Under Art. 2(3),
measures that are not based on scientific principle may consti-
tute a GATT Article XX disguised restriction on international
trade."'
States may enact measures which are more stringent than
international standards as long as they fall within the limits set
by SPS Article 5 .13 These limits state that measures, which are
governed by the agreement, shall be "based on an assessment,
as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risk to human, ani-
mal, or plant life, or health,""' and that such an assessment re-
lies on factors such as "available scientific evidence, relevant
106. See Smitherman, supra note 26, at 491.
107. Id.
108. GATT, supra note 100, at art. XX; see Smitherman, supra note 26, at 491.
109. SPS, supra note 104. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving Interna-
tional Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Direc-
tions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81 (2002); David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Agreement in the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32
N.Y.U.J. INT'L & POL. 865 (2000).
110. See SPS, supra note 104, at Annex A(1)(a)-(d). See id. at Annex A(1) for the
full definition of what is covered under the meaning of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures.
111. SPS, supra note 104, at arts. 2(1)-(2); see also Smitherman, supra note 26,
at 492-93.
112. SPS, supra note 104, at art. 2(3); see also GATT, supra note 100, at art. XX;
Smitherman, supra note 26, at 493.
113. SPS, supra note 104, at art. 5.
114. Id. at art. 5(1); see also Smitherman, supra note 26, at 493.
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processes, and production methods.""'5 Additionally, the SPS
requires that states narrowly tailor such measures to ensure
that they are not more restrictive on trade than is required to
achieve the level of safety desired.'16
3. The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety
Like the SPS, the CPB17 affects both the EU and the United
States. The EU is bound to the general principles and purposes
set forth in the CPB, but the protocol has yet to go into effect."'
Conversely, the United States adopted the convention but nei-
ther signed nor ratified the protocol."9
The CPB incorporates elements of the precautionary ap-
proach, as well as the U.S.-backed SPS risk assess-
mentlscientific evidence approach. The precautionary approach
appears in the Preamble, 20 where it reaffirms "the precaution-
ary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development." 12' The precautionary approach
is also mentioned in Article 10 where the CPB discusses a
state's procedures for decisions regarding importation.122 The
115. SPS, supra note 104, at art. 5(2); see also Smitherman, supra note 26, at
493.
116. SPS, supra note 104, at art. 5(6). SPS also considers the situation, which
many argue is relevant in the case of genetically modified food, where relevant sci-
entific information is insufficient. Id. In such a scenario, the measures that are
taken are subject to future objective risk assessment to be made within a reasonable
period of time. Id. at art. 5(7); see also Smitherman, supra note 26, at 493.
117. CPB, supra note 105.
118. Smitherman, supra note 26, at 494 (stating that the EU is bound to the
convention, though the CPB has yet to enter into force). Article 37 of the CPB covers
entry into force. CPB, supra note 105, at art. 37; see also Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity/Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, at http://www.biodiv.org/
world/parties.asp (last updated Dec. 13, 2002); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET:
UPDATE ON THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY (2002), available at http://us
info.state.gov/topical/global/biotech/02071201.htm (last updated July 11, 2002) (dis-
cussing the current status of parties to the convention, including the United States).
119. Michael A. Gollin, An Intellectual Property Rights Framework for Biodiver-
sity Prospecting, in WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING:
USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 159, 190 (1993); Par-
ties to the Convention on Biological Diversity/Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, supra
note 118.
120. Smitherman, supra note 26, at 495 (citing CPB, supra note 105, at pmbl.,
arts. 1, 10, 11, Annex II).
121. Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex I, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, 5 (1992).
122. CPB, supra note 105, at art. 10.
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CPB also incorporates the permissive approach, stating that
risk assessments based on scientific evidence shall be carried
out before a state makes an Article 10 decision.23 Importantly,
the document emphasizes that it "shall not be interpreted as
implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under
any existing international agreements."24 While the precau-
tionary and permissive approaches are exclusive and cannot co-
exist, it appears that the drafters intended to give effect to both
S • 125
principles.
The CPB furthers confusion as to the relevant international
standard. For instance, it appears to ignore a 1998 decision in
the WTO Appellate Body which favored the United States and
the permissive approach, indicating that the precautionary ap-
proach is not favored as an international standard.2 2 The mora-
torium and the current lack of a clear international standard for
defining, testing, and regulating GMOs is causing friction in the
market, resulting in lost trade and interruptions in humanitar-
ian aid. 1
27
E. THE CONFLICT AND LDCs - THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE
The impasse between the EU and the United States regard-
ing genetically modified food touches LDCs, such as Zimbabwe,
by impeding the distribution of international aid based on con-
cerns that the acceptance of the aid would detrimentally affect
Zimbabwe's export trade with the EU.128 In late May 2002, the
123. Smitherman, supra note 26, at 495 (citing CPB, supra note 105, at arts. 15,
16).
124. CPB, supra note 105, at pmbl.
125. See id. Compare id. arts. 1, 10, 11, Annex II, with arts. 15, 16 (calling for
risk assessment and risk management).
126. The WTO has issued interpretations about the precautionary principle,
which tip the scales in favor of the permissive approach. See Smitherman, supra
note 26, at 496. In 1998, U.S. and Canadian disputes against the EU involving the
banning of beef injected with growth hormone, ended with a finding in their favor,
determining that the level of impairment suffered by the United States was $116.8
million (US) per year of the ban. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communi-
ties - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),WT/DS26/AB/R
(Jan. 16, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-subjects
_indexe.htm#bkmk63. The WTO Appellate Body decision stated that it is "less
than clear that the precautionary principle is a principle of general or customary
international law." Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade in Living Modified
Organisms: The New Regimes, 49 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 856, 859 (2000); see also
Smitherman, supra note 26, at 496.
127. See Smitherman, supra note 26, at 475.
128. The U.S. State Department issued a statement, which said, "We call upon
the European Union to join us in assuring governments in the region (southern Af-
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United States Agency for International Development told Afri-
can officials there was not enough food certified free of genetic
modification to maintain a continual supply to southern Africa
for the anticipated famine. 29 States in need of food aid could ei-
ther take the corn offered to them or reject it and seek other do-
nors. 30 Forced with that decision, officials in Zimbabwe decided
in May 2002 to refuse the food aid from the United States.1
3
'
Europe's effective moratorium on GM food purportedly influ-
enced Zimbabwe's refusal of aid.3 2  Apparently, the officials
feared that if any of the GM maize was planted, it could con-
taminate crops, making it difficult for African farmers to export131
their products to Europe.
rica) that food made from biotech crops is safe and should be distributed immedi-
ately to those who so desperately need it." Reuters News Serv., US Asks EU to As-
sure Africans on Biotech Food (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://www.planetark.org/ daily-
newsstory.cfninewsid/17414/newsDate/23-Aug-2002/story.htm.
129. Zimbabwe Turns Away US Food Aid, supra note 5. The U.S. Agency for
International Development stressed that the food being offered to Zimbabwe has
been tested and has been eaten by Americans every day for the last seven years. See
Natsios, supra note 4. There seems to be confusion about this. Id. Contrarily, one
U.S. scholar, who was lecturing in the EU, said that no one wants the GMO grain,
and that even the Americans will not eat it, which obviously contradicts the state-
ments of the State Department. Id.
130. In October 2002, the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) sought another
16,000 tons of GM-free maize from within southern Africa for Zambia. Reuters
News Serv., WFP Says it Seeks Non-GM Food Aid for Zambia (Oct. 9, 2002), at
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/18103/story.htm. Zambia
banned all genetically modified food aid in August, citing health concerns. Id. "The
ban remains in place until the government establishes through its own tests if GM
foods are safe for human consumption." Id. WFP spokeswoman Jo Woods said that
approximately "$7 million in donations from Japan and the Netherlands would be
used to buy the 16,000 tons of GM-free maize for Zambia." Id.
131. Zimbabwe Turns Away US Food Aid, supra note 5. The U.S. State De-
partment blasted the President of Zimbabwe for pursuing policies that are seriously
contributing to the problem of hunger, including an aggressive land reform act,
which is taking the most valuable farmland out of production by kicking out white
farmers to distribute to patrons of his party. See Natsios, supra note 4.
132. See Zimbabwe Turns Away US Food Aid, supra note 5; Reuters News Serv.,
supra note 128. "Harare feared farmers would use it for planting or as animal feed,
thus jeopardizing Zimbabwe's beef exports to Europe, which has tough standards on
genetically-modified foods." Id. While the United States has been criticized for its
inability to offer GM free grains, it is really the EU's moratorium that is inhibiting
the market, not the mere fact that U.S. farmers are not required to separate geneti-
cally modified grain from non-biotech grain when they deliver it to market. See
Natsios, supra note 4. The EU does not regulate or mandate labeling of meat fed on
GMO feed corn, therefore Zimbabwean fears were not founded by EU warnings,
however, Zimbabwe was also reportedly worried about genetic "contamination" slip-
ping into their grain crops. Id. If such contamination happened, the EU would
likely reject "GMO contaminated food." Id.
133. Id.
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Then on August 2, 2002, one day after a U.S. deadline, U.S.
officials announced that the Zimbabwe government had recon-
sidered and decided to accept 20,000 tons of food aid needed to
feed hungry Zimbabweans. 3 4 The Zimbabwean government ac-
cepted the maize with the condition that it is milled before im-
portation.135 While wide scale tragedy may have been averted by
this decision, the delays associated with uncertain food policies
affected the smooth transaction and efficiency of the food relief
"market," mimicking the interruptions caused by market fail-
ures in the international GMO trade.
III. THREE INSTANCES OF GMO MARKET FAILURE
The lack of agreement on the appropriate GMO regulatory
system has created a problem in southern Africa in particular,
and has prevented the international community from address-
ing three types of market failure that exist in the GMO market:
information asymmetry, environmental protection, and the free-
rider problem. Market failure occurs where the force that drives
market-based economies is interrupted or stymied and the mar-
ket does not efficiently allocate resources to achieve the greatest
possible consumer satisfaction. 3 6  This force is commonly re-
ferred to as the "invisible hand," which keeps markets moving or
working efficiently. 137 The invisible hand is the force that allows
producers to assess cost and consumers to assess value, such
that the price of any good is set at that equilibrium point where
consumer and producer satisfaction is maximized and ultimate
social utility and efficiency is achieved. 35  While the invisible
hand keeps economic trading systems efficient, this force does
134. Zimbabwe Reconsiders GM Grain, supra note 5.
135. Id. Milling solves the problem by making the maize unusable for planting.
Reuters News Serv., supra note 128. Other states made special provision for accep-
tance of the food or accepted it only because there were no other options. Id. Ma-
lawi said it had no choice but to accept the GM maize. Id. Mozambique, where Ma-
lawi's food aid will pass through, had asked the World Food Programme to cover it
with plastic sheeting to avoid spillage while in transit. Id. In Zambia, President
Levy Mwanawasa said his government will have to examine donated GM food and
established its safety first before giving it to the hungry. Id.
136. AMOSWEB ECONOMIC GLOSSARAMA, at http://www.amosweb.com/cgi-
bin/gls-src.pl?fcd=dsp&key=market+failure (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
137. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
138. Don Fullerton & Robert Stavins, How Economists See the Environment, in
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: SELECTED PAPERS OF ROBERT N.
STAVINS, 1988-1999, at 24 (Wallace E. Oates & Henk Folmer eds., 2000).
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not contemplate issues of equity.139 Capitalists often argue
against government regulation or intervention in a market be-
cause it disturbs these forces, and because market forces rather
than government interventions are often more efficient. 140 How-
ever, when markets fail, economists and policymakers are often
able to justify government intervention because intervention
will increase the utility of all parties.1
4 1
A. AKERLOF'S THEORY OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE
MARKET FOR LEMONS
In 2001, George Akerlof won a Nobel Prize in economics for
his theories on information asymmetry and the market for "lem-
ons."142  Information asymmetry exists when three conditions
are present: (1) quality is inconsistent between similar looking
goods; (2) it is impossible for consumers to determine the quali-
tative difference between goods; and (3) the producer is capable
of ascertaining the value difference between goods.4 3  Because
the consumer and producer do not have symmetrical informa-
tion about the value of the product, the market cannot function
smoothly and prices generally trend downward as skeptical con-
sumers refuse to pay for "good quality" because they cannot dis-
tinguish it from "bad quality."'44 This downward spiral can lead
139. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
142. See George Akerlof Wins Nobel Prize in Economics, at http:ll
www.berkeley.edu/news/features/2001/nobel (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). In his writ-
ings, Akerlof used the easy to understand example of the used car market as a
means of illustrating the principle of asymmetry. George A. Akerlof, The Market for
"Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489-
92 (1970). He said that an individual buys a car in the used car market without
knowing whether the car he buys will be good or a lemon, because the cars look the
same and the buyer cannot tell the difference. Id. The buyer could assign a certain
probability to the car about whether it was a lemon or a good car. Id. After owning
a specific car for a length of time the car owner can form a good idea as to the quality
of the machine. Id. This estimate is more accurate than the original estimate but
good cars and bad cars must sell at the same price because no buyer can differenti-
ate between a good car and a bad one. Id. Therefore, a buyer is locked in and can
never expect to get the true value of his car at resale because it will be discounted by
the uncertainty created by the presence of lemons in the market. Id. Nor can he
expect to get the value of a new car, therefore a person with a good car is more likely
to retain it while someone with a lemon is more likely to try to sell it, further exac-
erbating the problem until the discount is sufficient for the intrepid buyer to enter
the market. Id.
143. Akerlof, supra note 142, at 489; see also supra note 141 and accompanying
text.
144. Akerlof, supra note 142, at 490.
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to decreasing market quality and market size, whereby social
145
utility fails to be maximized and market failure occurs.
Akerlof discussed that in such situations government inter-
vention into the market may increase the welfare of all par-
ties. 6 One example of government intervention to relieve in-
formation asymmetry is licensing.17 Doctors, lawyers, and even
barbers are licensed so that the consumer can know, without
costly research, that such a person has met a least some mini-
mal qualification to practice her particular profession.
Akerlof also describes institutions that may arise in mar-
kets to counteract information asymmetry without government-
sponsored intervention, including guarantees, brand name
goods, and chains. 4 s For example, a customer might stop at a
roadside fast food chain because he knows exactly what he will
get - fast, inexpensive food at acceptable standards of hygiene.
4
1
Chain recognition is one non-government solution to the infor-
mation asymmetry problem a road traveler encounters when
looking for food, however, even this market-controlled solution
is supported by government involvement in the form of trade-
mark protection. 
15
One proposed solution to information asymmetry in the
GMO market is identity preservation."' Identity preservation is
a system of crop management and trade that allows the source
or nature of materials to be identified, effectively segregating a
market into two sub-markets."' Identity preservation subdi-
vides the "food market" into two submarkets: one for organic
145. See id. at 488.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 500.
148. Id. at 499-500.
149. See id.
150. Akerlof, supra note 142, at 499-500. Chain recognition operates on con-
sumer goodwill towards the chain, which is protected in part by laws that regulate
brand names and trademarks. Id. A downside of such non-government market struc-
tures is that they do not act to increase distributional equity, because often brands
are able to charge a premium, which prices items outside the reach of low-income
individuals. Id.
151. See EUROPEAN COMM'N DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR AGRIC., ECONOMIC IMPACTS
OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS ON THE AGRI-FOOD SECTOR, ch. 5, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/gmo/ch5.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
152. Id. Such a standard is used for organic foods and dolphin safe tuna. See id.
at 1. Identity preservation ensures that a crop is monitored through the food chain
to guarantee certain qualities that might command a premium. AGRIC. COMM., U.K.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE SEGREGATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, REP.
NO. 3, paras. 6-7 (2000), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm199900/cmselectlcmagric/71J7102.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
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and another for inorganic. 5 1 In so doing, however, potential
economies of scale are lost and production costs likely shift up-
ward, thereby reducing the aggregate amount produced and in-
creasing the prices of both markets.
5 4
B. MARKET EXTERNALITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
According to environmental economists, market external-
ities are environmental costs that may be incurred due to prom-
ulgation of GMOs. 5 5 A market externality occurs when some
consequence of producing or consuming a good is external to the
market.'56 Because the consequence is external to the market,
the market price does not reflect the true societal cost or bene-
fit.'57 This creates a market disequilibria, which can only be
remedied through intervention." A typical example of a market
externality is air pollution.5 9 With a negative externality like
air pollution the total social cost of production (poor air quality)
may exceed the value of the product to consumers because the
"true cost" of production is not captured in the market and
passed on to consumers. 6 ° The government however, can inter-
vene into the market to provide a mechanism to capture exter-
nalities.'6 '
The United States typically uses two methods to capture
the external cost of air pollution and charge it to the producer so
that it may be reflected in consumer pricing.6 2 The first is to set
emission levels or standards. 6 3  Any source exceeding the al-
lowed level may be subject to both civil and criminal penalties."
153. EUROPEAN COMM'N DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR AGRIC., supra note 151, at 1.
154. See id. at 3. The EU Agriculture Commission has determined that identity
preservation would increase commodity prices by six to seventeen percent world-
wide. Id. Costs rise exponentially as tolerance levels increase. Id.
155. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
156. See Fullerton & Stavins, supra note 138, at 24.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 24-25.
160. Id. at 24.
161. See id.
162. See Fullerton & Stavins, supra note 138, at 24-25.
163. Point source water pollution and benzene pollution are commonly used as
examples of areas where the government has set a standard that cannot be exceeded
at a point source. Id. at 25. Benzene does not mix in the airshed and so a permit
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The second method is to sell pollution credits.'6 5 To bring the ex-
ternality into the market, the government creates a parallel
market to buy and sell pollution credits that allow the holder to
emit pollution.'66
If the parallel market is not subject to market failure, the
pollution credits are often regarded as more economically sound,
as they tend to interfere less with the market by allowing com-
panies to seek production solutions tailor-made to their particu-
lar situation. 167 The credit market achieves this efficiency
through trades because any company that has high abatement
costs can buy permits from another that has low costs, thereby
reducing the total cost of abating pollution. 68 While a credit
system is not appropriate for no-tolerance pollution such as nu-
clear waste, it has proved to be a very effective tool for regulat-
ing pollution that the general population is willing to tolerate at
some level, such as air pollution.'
69
In the GMO market, gene transfers may cause genetic con-
tamination to weedy native relatives and can be likened to air or
water pollution.170 Environmental activists wish to eliminate
GMOs by adopting a "command and control" regulatory model
with zero tolerance; a model that economists agree is most ap-
propriate for hazardous materials, such as some heavy metal
pollution which causes grave danger to human life but has local-
ized effects.'' Alternatively, economists often recommend a
credit-based pollution rights system where production methods
might vary the degree of pollution and where some contamina-
tion can be tolerated to pursue other societal benefits. 7'
165. Id. at 24.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 24-25.
168. Fullerton & Stavins, supra note 138, at 25.
169. Id. at 24-25. The United States requires electrical producers to hold a per-
mit for each ton of So 2 emitted. Id. Overall, this market intervention has succeeded
in reducing acid rain deposition by fifty percent in a cost-effective manner. Id.
170. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
171. Richard Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emis-
sions Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 67 (1998). In the environmental economics
field, command and control refers to government regulations on polluters through
the use of licenses, permits, zoning regulations, or other controls. Id. This contrasts
with economics-based controls which create secondary markets to limit, including





C. MARKET INNOVATION INCENTIVES AND FREE-RIDERS
GMO developers are concerned about recapturing their re-
search and development cost for GMOs. 173 In economic terms
they are worried about the free-rider problem. A free-rider is
someone who situates himself to enjoy the benefits of something
without paying the costs. 17' For example, a producer can pass
along the cost of research and development of a GMO to the con-
sumer. However, if a free-rider can simply copy the product as
her own without incurring the research and development costs,
the free-rider can sell at a discount and undercut the creator's
price .
Without protection of innovation and creativity, the market
harbors a strong disincentive to undertake research and devel-
opment or other creative work. 176  In creative and innovative
fields, intellectual property rights can often ameliorate this
problem. 7 7 Intellectual property rights provide a mechanism by
which the legal system protects producers' ability to recapture
the cost of their creative work through the exclusive sale of their
work.
178
Unfortunately, there is not a universal understanding of in-
tellectual property rights pertaining to seeds. In the 1980 deci-
sion, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and in subsequent legal prece-
dent, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that private firms
engaged in developing new uses of plant and animal genetic ma-
terials may seek full patent protection for their inventions.
179
Other approaches acknowledge "breeders rights," to use a pat-
ented seed as an initial source of variation for ones own creation
and a "farmer's privilege" to propagate a protected seed line for
173. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
174. WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN, ECONOMICS 98 (Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1991).
175. See Gollin, supra note 119, at 190.
176. See Fullerton & Stavins, supra note 138, at 24.
177. See id. at 23.
178. See id. at 20-21. Intellectual property rights create a new market to rem-
edy the economic disincentive of research and development without assurance of be-
ing able to recapture costs. Id. at 19-20. However, no market mechanism deter-
mines the optimal balance or distribution of benefits produced by an invention. Id.
at 47 n.7. An intellectual property regime may be abused so that a producer is re-
ceiving more benefits (or economic rent) than is efficient for the market. Id.
179. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1980) (ruling that a geneti-
cally engineered bacterium could be granted a utility patent under standard patent
law); see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); In re Hibberd, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985); In re Allen 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425 (1987).
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the farmer's own use.18° The Western style system of property




Anthropologists argue that the current system of intellec-
tual property rights for seeds altered with biotechnology
amounts to an extension of colonialism that has continued
seamlessly through the Green Revolution to the new era of bio-
technology innovation. 182 Some Western companies have used
their superior resources and understanding of the patent system
to legalize their free-rider status. 8' For example, U.S. based
property holders patented Andean quinoa, a grain developed by
Andean farmers.14 "Put crudely, [Andean] potato farmers are
now expected to pay the [U.S. based] patent holders for the end-
product of their own centuries-old knowledge," each time their
quinoa enters into the United States.'
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBP) provides the international framework for property rights
as they concern plant, animal, and genetic material.18  Article
11 allows countries to adopt, "as far as possible and as appropri-
ate, economically, and socially sound" incentives for the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biodiversity.' 7 These incentives
include intellectual property rights, national conservation, and
natural resources laws.1 8 8 The United States initially rejected
the CBP because it felt that Articles 16 and 19 did not go far
enough in protecting intellectual property rights.'8 9 The provi-
sions are unclear and could be interpreted to permit national
laws requiring technology transfers as a condition of access to
habitats and linkage of technology transfer to conservation pol-
icy, both principles the that United States does not support.' ° It
180. PAARLBERG, supra note 15, at 5.
181. See id. (discussing the different levels of intellectual property rights recog-
nized in Kenya, Brazil, India, and China).
182. Id. at 4.
183. See, e.g., infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
184. See POTPrIER, supra note 39, at 184.
185. Id. See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
186. Michael A. Gollin, The Convention of Biological Diversity and Intellectual
Property Rights, in WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, BIODIrERSITY PROSPECTING:
USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 289, 290 (1993); see
also CPB, supra note 105.
187. Gollin, supra note 186, at 295-99 (discussing the United Nations Conven-






is more likely, however, that these provisions can be interpreted
as supporting two-way technology transfer as a voluntary mat-
ter. 
191
The Akerlof Lemon information asymmetry, externalities,
and free-rider problems are all examples of market failure in the
GMO market.'92 Such market failure, however, can often be cor-
rected by government intervention.9 Surveys have shown that
consumers favor strict government regulation and suggest a
preference towards international regulation of biotechnology,
including the United Nations and the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO).94 The food market is uniquely situated because of
its dual identity as a traded commodity and as a necessity
guarded by international human rights documents, which estab-
lish an aspiration to a basic right of food.19'
IV. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Positive law does not presently guarantee any legally en-
forceable right to food.9 6 This is partly because the right to food
is seen as economic and aspirational in nature.'97 A growing
number of scholars are beginning to recognize a universal obli-
gation to act against the use of hunger as a weapon. 99 Strenu-
ous efforts are being made to secure universal recognition to a
right to food. 99 However, even if the right is perfect, there is not
a right to a certain type of food. 00
191. Id. at 299.
192. See supra notes 128, 137-80 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
194. See HALLMAN, supra note 52, at 7 (referring to recent studies in Europe,
Japan, the United States, and Canada).
195. See ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 11; UDHR, supra note 10, at art. 25; in-
fra notes 194-212 and accompanying text.
196. Josee Domestici-Met, Combating Man-Made Famine: Legal Instruments, in
THE GEOPOLITICS OF HUNGER, 2000-2001: HUNGER AND POWER, supra note 47, at
227.
197. See generally id. (describing the nature and limits to a legal right to food).
198. Domestici-Met, supra note 196, at 227.
199. Id.
200. ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 11(a)-(b). The plain words of the ICESCR
clearly lack any mention of GMOs and in interpreting the goals of the right, primacy
is placed on equitable distribution and efficient use of resources not consumer choice
or taste. Id, see also infra note 213 and accompanying text. There may be an excep-
tion for safety and religious reasons, with the aim of equity and efficient utilization
of resources. ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 11(a)-(b).
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A. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) an-
nounces a general right to food.20' The UDHR protects an indi-
vidual's "right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,"202
and "to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully realized."
20 3
B. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS
Religious freedom is protected in Article 18 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
guarantees the right of religious and ethical observance.2 4 Arti-
cle 18 states that "this right shall include freedom to have or
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either indi-
vidually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching."2 °' If certain modifications to GMO food are for-
bidden by religious or ethical observance, a consumer would
need information about the modification to protect the exercise
of her right to religious and ethical observance. 26 Nevertheless,
this right may be limited if the restriction is prescribed by law
and is "necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or mor-
als or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."2 7
C. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR) recognizes a broad right to food.208
201. UDHR, supra note 10, at art. 25.
202. Id.
203. Id. at art. 28. Also relevant are guarantees that everyone has the right of
religious observance (art. 2), life, liberty and the security of person (art. 3), and the
right to not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home
(art.12). Id. at arts. 2, 3, 12. Only after the EU and the United States have resolved
the GM food impasse, and the international community has endeavored to address
equity in the GM food market, will economic order be possible. See UDHR, supra
note 10, at art. 28.
204. ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 18(1).
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
207. ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 11 (emphasis added).
208. ICESCR, supra note 8; see D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
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Though the international community has not accepted all of the
principles of the ICESCR into customary international law,
many aspects are binding to the extent that a state must show
209progress toward the precepts in line with the state's resources
and refrain from acts that would destroy the object or purpose of
the Covenant.21°
Of the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR, the ICESCR declares
the most extensive rights regarding food and feeding the hun-
gry. Article 11(1) of the ICESCR states that it is "the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food .... ,,211 In Article 11(2), the
ICESCR discusses the need for international co-operation as fol-
lows:
The States parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamen-
tal right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually
and through international co-operation, the measures, including spe-
cific programmes, which are needed.
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of
food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by dis-
seminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing
or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most ef-
ficient development and utilization of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food
supplies in relation to need.
212
The ICESCR balances two separate goals while supporting the
right to food: (1) meeting the needs of the hungry through equi-
table distribution; and (2) achieving the most efficient develop-
ment and utilization of resources.213
INTERNATIONAL LAW 625 (5th ed. 1998). The ICCPR embodies the primary genera-
tion of rights and is generally accepted as customary international law. Id. The
ICESCR embodies second generation rights which frequently stop short of rising to
customary international law but which parties to the ICESR must respect in object
and purpose so as not to contravene the standards they embody. Id.
209. ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 8. This is presently interpreted to infer an
immediate obligation, and no floor threshold level of development need be attained
prior to the perfection of the obligation. Domestici-Met, supra note 196, at 228.
210. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, art. XVIII, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that those states which have signed but
not ratified a treaty may not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty).
211. ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 11 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at art. 11(2)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
213. See id. at arts. 11(2), 25.
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D. THE FORMAL RIGHT TO FOOD
The only fundamental right listed in either the ICCPR or
the ICESCR is the right to food.21' Nonetheless, legal analysts
do not regard the standard announced by the ICESCR to be suf-
ficient to establish a right to food under international law.211
However, this standard garners further support from several
General Assembly resolutions, including G.A. Res. 34/46, which
recognizes a state's external duty to guarantee the right to
proper nourishment, "through the adoption of measures at the
national and international levels, including establishment of the
new international economic order."216  This duty includes the
duty to aid the deprived, to protect from deprivation, and not to
deprive.217 Furthermore, while commentators recognize that the
right to food is not determinate under international law, the
states' external duties support the idea that international agen-
cies should be encouraged to undertake an in-depth self-analysis
of their own obligations regarding the right to food.'
Three arguments typically arise against the recognition of
the general right to food. 219 The first is that the right to food is a
moral or humanitarian consideration and is not alone sufficient
to move states and other actors to respect a right to food. 22  The
second argument is that the complexity of the problem and the
absence of consensus regarding solutions make it impossible to
214. Id.
215. Philip Alston, International Law and the Rights to Food, in FOOD AS A
HUMAN RIGHT 162 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1984). In an essay in support of a nor-
mative right to food under international human rights law, Alston asserts that
ICESCR, art. 11(2)(a), promotes the realization of the right to food by establishing
the objectives to improve the method of food production, distribution, and conserva-
tion and furthermore, establishes the proper means of doing so. Id. at 167-68 (apply-
ing the corollary of duties which attach to a subsistence right). Specifically the
means of promoting these objectives is making full use of technical and scientific
knowledge, disseminating knowledge about nutrition, and developing or reforming
agrarian systems in such a way for the efficient development and utilization of natu-
ral resources. Id.
216. Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations
System for Improving the Effective Employment of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 171, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/34/46 (1979); see Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the
United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 133, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at art.
7, U.N. Doc. A/Res./36/133 (1981).
217. Alston, supra note 215, at 169-70.
218. Id. at 173.




establish effective machinery for implementation of the right to
food.2 1 The final argument is that civil and political rights are
primary and that economic, social, and cultural rights, such as
the right to food, can only be realized once the people of the
world have attained freedom.222
E. A HUMAN RIGHTS TEST FOR POLICYMAKERS 
223
Medical law frequently deals with the intersection of law
and ethics.224 The issue of GMO trade also falls at this intersec-
tion. This intersection led an Irish scholar, Tom A. Cooney,
L.L.M., to propose a human rights impact assessment test for
public health laws and policies.225 Cooney's test is anchored on
the fundamental principle of equality.226 Cooney suggests sev-
eral other important principles, including self-determination,
justice, beneficence, and non-malfeasance.2 7 Under Cooney's
test, the scope and application of the principles are balanced af-
ter thoughtful moral and legal argument.
2 1
Cooney proposes the elements of a test to help medical prac-
titioners and public health policymakers balance these princi-
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Tom Cooney, Lectures at the University College Dublin (Sept. - Dec. 2002)
(notes on file with author). Tom Cooney, BCL, LLM, lecturer at University College
Dublin, developed a human rights test to help policymakers evaluate public health
legislation. The human rights test illustrated in this article is the result of his work,
translated by the author into the context of genetically modified food regulation.
Any corruption of the public health human rights test by applying it to genetically
modified food market regulation is the sole responsibility of the author.
224. See id. at 1.
225. See id. at 57.
226. See id. at 4.
The evaluation holds that it is equally important that each person have the
right to face up, according to his or her own lights, to the challenge of pur-
suing a worthwhile life. This assumes that each of us should appreciate
the importance of living in a way that is appropriate to who and what he or
she is ....
On the one side, it means fashioning a cultural, political and legal context
in which individuals are guaranteed equal respect for their capacity to take
responsibility for their own lives. On the other side, it requires assuring
each person equal concern. This means distributing resources from the
community's finite pool of resources to repair, so far as practicable, ine-
qualities in personal capabilities and luck so as to enable people to live
worthwhile lived of their own choosing.
Id.
227. See id. at 4-6.
228. See id. at 6, 8.
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ples to come to legally and morally right decisions. 229 Before at
tempting to apply the test, however, policymakers must first de-
velop an appropriate framework for the test including: (1) exam-
ining whether the group the policy will affect is subject to social
prejudice; and (2) examining the information regarding the pol-
icy to ensure that it is based on rigorous and impartial fact find-
ing and that information is gathered from those who will be di-
rectly effected by the policy.230 The test itself includes at least
six important steps:
1. Clarify specific health objectives;
2. Evaluate likely effectiveness of the policy;
3. Ensure the policy is correctly focused or targeted;
4. Examine each policy for possible human rights interven-
tions;
5. Find the least restrictive alternative; and
6. If the policy is coercive, it should be the most effective,
least restrictive policy to prevent a real and substantial
danger.23'
V. PROMOTING THE REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO
FOOD.
The culinary sovereignty232 of the EU is important but the
precautionary principle cannot be defended ad infinitum. It is a
right that is limited, even in the Cartagena protocol, by the need
229. See Cooney, supra note 223, at 7-8.
230. See id. at 157-60.
231. See id. at 160-69.
1. Any limitation on a patient's right should be intended to serve a de-
monstrable purpose of sufficient importance to warrant overriding the
right involved. The demands of symmetry in balancing require that
that purpose relate to competing human rights. The purpose should be,
in the particular circumstances, pressing and substantial and not
merely legitimate.
2. The limitation on a patient's right should be rationally related to the
compelling purpose so as to accomplish that purpose under the existing
circumstances, without causing hardships or deprivations unrelated or
unnecessary to the achievement of that purpose.
3. The limitation should be carefully designed so as to impair as little as
possible the right in question.
Id. at 7.
232. York, supra note 20, at 470. "In other words, while [the] culinary sover-
eignty [of the EU] is a significant value, it is not so much so that 828 million of the




for risk assessment based on scientific evidence. 233 The 828 mil-
lion people in the world who are chronically malnourished have
a right to improved production by making full use of science and
technology.234 A Kenyan agricultural researcher wrote:
The needs of Africa and Europe are different. Europe has
surplus food and has never experienced hunger, mass starvation
and death on [the] regular scale we sadly witness in Africa. The
priority of Africa is to feed her people with safe foods and to sus-
tain agricultural production and the environment .... The criti-
cism of agribiotech products in Europe is based on socioeconomic
issues and not food safety issues; no evidence so far justifies the
opinion of some in Europe that Africa should be excluded from
transgenic crops. Africans can speak for themselves .... The
African continent, more than any other, urgently needs agricul-
tural biotechnology.235
The current international agreements regarding food and
the environment are contradictory and ambiguous. In addition,
the SPS, GATT, and CPB all fail to balance the health, political,
and legal implications of a right to food, however poorly defined
it is under international law.236 State sponsored intervention,
however, can address the GMO market failures.237 One step to-
wards remedying these issues is to develop a human rights test
for policymakers, by which to scrutinize new regulations needed
to govern the GMO Market.
A. THE EU MORATORIUM AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
The concern over accepting food aid in southern Africa is
symptomatic of market failures promulgated by inadequate
regulation in the international GMO market. Food is both a
fundamental right and a widely traded commodity.38 This dual
status makes food unique among other goods.2 9 In the case of
southern Africa, both of these factors had a part in how the EU
moratorium precipitated delays in humanitarian aid.24 °
A solution to the food aid acceptance problem, however,
233. See Smitherman, supra note 26, at 495 (citing CPB, supra note 105, at arts.
15-16).
234. See ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 11(2)(a).
235. See York, supra note 20, at 469-70.
236. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
238. Alston, supra note 215, at 163.
239. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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does not lie in WTO dispute resolution of the EU moratorium. If
the EU moratorium is a disguised restraint, it is illegal under
Article XX of GATT.241 If the EU moratorium is justified, there
is essentially a need to balance the rights of the hungry to food,
and the rights of the EU to culinary sovereignty.242 Under the
ICESCR and U.N.G.A. Res. 34/46, the EU has a duty to avoid
depriving other states from the right to food, including a duty to
avoid international policies and practices that deprive other
states of their means of subsistence.2 43 Broadly interpreted, this
duty could extend to avoiding international policies that inhibit
delivery of food aid.244
However, there is a causal disconnect because the EU did
not decide for southern Africa to decline food aid, nor did it give
any indication whatsoever that acceptance of the aid would en-
danger exports to the EU.2 4' Therefore, if the moratorium is jus-
tified, a rift could develop between states which accept GMO
technology and those which reject it; this would in turn hamper
global trade by bifurcating the market.246 This would create a
GMO cold war that would not resolve the humanitarian aid is-
sue and would likely lead to continued restrictions on trade re-
sulting in market inefficiencies.247
The most effective solution for the humanitarian aid accep-
tance issue, is the adoption of a single, clear, yet flexible, inter-
national standard that remedies market failure, while promot-
ing the fundamental right to food outlined in the ICESCR
Article 11.248 The most acceptable standard is a human rights
standard that embraces a thoughtful balance of efficiency and
equity.
B. A HUMAN RIGHTS TEST TO EVALUATE MARKET INTERVENTION
The rights of the hungry take precedence over the rights of
culinary sovereigntists.24 International documents recognize a
right to food, adequate for health and well-being,25 ° and to be
241. See discussion supra Part W.A.
242. See supra notes 132, 232 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 10, 202 and accompanying text.
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free from hunger, limited only by measures to protect the en-
vironment, health, and safety. However, no scientific evidence
exists indicating GMOs are a threat to human health.252
In the balance between the right of culinary sovereignty
254
and the rights of individuals to be free from hunger, the rights
of the hungry must be given greater weight. The concern of the
hungry is life over death. The concerns of culinary sovereign-
tists are only the claims of scientifically unsupported fears of
the unknown.256  Therefore, when considering food regulation
schemes, policymakers must not only consider principles of free
market economies and the desire to create a political consensus
among the countries, they must also take into account human
rights.2 5 7 Any regulation which stands in the way of giving the
hungry greater access to food should be viewed as suspect and
scrutinized with the highest standards.25 s
A human rights test gives policymakers a tool with which to
scrutinize regulations that might affect the ability of the hungry
to exercise their right to food. The invisible hand of the market
does not consider the desires of people who have no economic
power in the market.259 Therefore, without a human rights test,
only the concerns of culinary sovereigntists will be addressed be-
cause they have market power.26° Consequently, a human rights
test with which policymakers can scrutinize regulations is
needed to give effect to the choices of the undernourished.
C. OUTLINE FOR A GMO MARKET HUMAN RIGHTS TEST
Intervention in the GMO market is necessary to promote a
free market. A human rights test is an important tool that
would provide a means by which policymakers could justify
251. See supra notes 8, 208-13 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 202, 207 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 197-99 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a hu-
man rights test for deliberations regarding public health regulation, where policies
affecting disadvantaged groups may be formulated). Because this is a legislative
rather than a judicial deliberation there need not be a historical or juridical recogni-
tion of the group as historically disadvantaged, but rather a determination based on
a reasonable person giving the matter thoughtful consideration. See supra notes
219-26 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 139, 232 and accompanying text.
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their decisions to consumer and environmental groups, which
are more likely to be persuaded by regulations that have not
only passed the scrutiny of GATT standards, but also those im-
posed by the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR.26'
It is important to note that the use of a human rights test is
not dependent on a legally enforceable right to food.262 The test
can be applied by policymakers prior to achieving an interna-
tionally, legally recognizable right to food.263  In a judicial
framework, policy decisions regarding a right to food may be a
social, political, and economic impossibility. 264 Policymakers are
not limited, however, by the jus cogens of the international
community, meaning they can use the test as an appropriate
standard by which to analyze their own policy decisions. 265 Tra-
ditionally, the hungry have been susceptible to discrimination
by policymakers.266 Judicial recognition of a right to food may
ameliorate this problem by facilitating a ruling that market in-
terventions which harm the hungry contravene the object and
purpose of the ICESCR and the ICCPR.267
A human rights test would essentially be a balancing test
by which to consider proposed regulations.265 The test must,
first and foremost, be based on reliable fact finding.269 GMOs
are a multidisciplinary topic that touches not only upon science
and market factors but also ethics, religion, consumer choice,
development, law, environment, poverty, and hunger.27° There-
fore, in addition to hard scientific evidence, which is supported
by the SPS,2 1 voices of all these disciplines, as well as commu-
272
nity-centered knowledge, must be given a chance to make
their arguments.Once reliable facts are established, policymakers must ex-
261. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (illustrating consumer support
for international regulation of GMOs and general mistrust of corporate self govern-
ance).
262. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing the right to food
as an aspirational economic right rather than a legal right, enforceable by jurists
under public international law).
264. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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amine proposed regulations through the lens of the test.273 The
policymaker's first job is to ensure that the regulation has a
clear and specific purpose with detailed objectives.274 Second,
the policymaker must test the means by which the objective is to
be achieved to determine that it is rationally related to the pro-
posed purpose.275 Next, the effectiveness of the regulation must
be evaluated.2 6 Policymakers must then judge whether there is
a more effective means by which to achieve the same objective
without intruding on consumers' rights to food or culinary sov-
• 277
ereignty. Fourth, the policymakers should discern whether
the policy considers the populations most at risk and in need of
protection.
Each regulation must also be examined to determine the
nature of the human right it infringes, because all regulations
will not infringe in the same manner. 279 To do this, policymak-
ers must ask four questions: (1) what is the nature of the right
infringed upon?; (2) what is the degree of interference?; (3) what
is the frequency and scope of the interference?; and (4) what is
the duration of the interference? 280 Throughout this examina-
tion, policymakers should keep in mind the premise that con-
sumers should be afforded the opportunity to make real deci-
sions regarding the potential risks and benefits of GMOs.28'
D. USING THE HuMAN RIGHTS TEST TO RESOLVE THE LEMON
DILEMMA
The genetically modified food market shares many charac-
teristics of an Akerlof lemon market. Producers plant and
originate the seeds and, therefore, are able to distinguish the
modified from the unmodified seeds, so long as processors main-
tain a segregation of products.2 s' This information asymmetry
present in the GMO market must be addressed to eliminate
273. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 230 and accompanying text
279. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
283. Akerlof, supra note 142, at 189; see also supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
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market failure. 284 However, maintaining segregation, standard-
izing labeling information, and passing such information on to
the consumer is a costly endeavor, and producers might lose
much of the price advantage they received from engineering the
285GMO seed if they were to undertake these measures.
In countries where there is a significant consumer base that
does not want to eat GMO foods, a natural market solution may
arise in response to a lemon dilemma.285 Entrepreneurs may de-
velop brand name goods that are GMO free and sold at a pre-
mium. 287 One downside of brand name goods, however, is that
the premium usually charged by brand name goods may price
low-income families out of any real choice to consume non-
genetically modified food.28 Therefore, while brand name goods
may be an efficient market centered response, it may not be an
equitable response.
Instead of relying on this potentially inequitable market re-
sponse, states should institute an appropriate labeling regime to
protect consumer choice and the free exercise of ethical and reli-
gious observance."" At a minimum, a labeling scheme informs
the consumer of what exactly she is consuming. As a result,
even if brand name GMO free goods are out of her reach, she
has the information needed to avoid certain foods, which mightbe contrary to her ethical and religious obs 290be cntrry r drlig ooservance. In states
without labeling regimes, a consumer has no way of knowing
how her food has been produced or what genetic material itS• 291
might contain.
The WTO or the WHO should develop international guide-
lines for national labeling standards of GMO food products, util-
izing the human rights test to balance the benefits and burdens
of regulations. These guidelines should cover issues that affect
284. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 41-42, 151-54 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. It is also quite possible
that a brand name line might be introduced which is genetically modified for nutri-
tional value-added characteristics, such as vitamin and mineral enhanced foods,
lower fat content items, or higher protein products, and that these goods would have
a premium value due to their modification. See supra notes 148-50 and accompany-
ing text.
288. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. Consumer choice is tied to a
human rights test based on the principle of equity. This is equivalent to the concept
of informed consent in the medical field. See supra note 226.
290. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 129.
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free exercise of the right to religious and ethical observance em-
bodied in the ICCPR,292 as well as address and advise consumers
of any scientifically supportable health threats or concerns.293
The labeling regime should be state specific and narrowly tai-
lored to account for differences in marketing, household mar-
kets, literacy, food concerns, and enforcement capabilities.294
Setting such guidelines at an international level would ac-
knowledge an international aspirational right to food, as well as
lend a credible and trusted measuring stick to national stan-
dards.295
In order for a labeling scheme to work, the national gov-
ernments must set standards and provide enforcement.296 The
state-specific regulatory system is important because of the
huge difference in how people buy their food and the nature of
their concerns in various states. 297 For example, the regulatory
system appropriate for states where open-air markets are stan-
dard, little food is packaged, and the populous is not highly lit-
erate, would be different than that which would be appropriate
for a state which has more invested in the infrastructure of food
distribution, most food is packaged, and the literacy rate is
high.299 Other factors that would influence the creation of a na-
tional standard include money available for enforcement and
genetic bio-test kits, as well as the prevailing concerns of the
populous.
299
A labeling regime provides consumers with more informa-
tion and, therefore, ameliorates the GMO information asymme-
try.Y° While the standards for the labeling regime should be
state specific, an international body such as the WHO or WTO
should provide guidelines for such regulations because they are
considered the most trustworthy by consumers.3  In its guide-
lines, the international body should recommend a human rights
test for labeling regulations and enforcement, which would bal-
292. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 194, 200 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 204-07, 289 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 204-07, 289 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 204-07, 289 and accompanying text
299. See supra notes 204-07, 289 and accompanying text,
300. See supra Part III.A. (discussing information asymmetry and the lemon
dilemma). One disadvantage of a labeling regime is that it does not provide an equi-
table mechanism to ensure that low-income people who do not want to eat GMO food
will not have to eat it. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
301. HALLMAN, supra note 52, at 7.
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ance the benefits of regulation against the burdens placed on
the right to religious and ethical observance. °2 This would help
policymakers select the scheme, which is narrowly tailored to
place the fewest limitations on religious and ethical obser-
303
vance.
E. AMELIORATING EXTERNALITIES IN THE GMO MARKET
Environmental contamination and destruction of biodiver-
sity are appropriate cases for government intervention and
regulation because they are structural externalities, the cost of
which is not included in the value of the good.304 The task of
regulations involving externalities is to capture the environ-
mental effects of production in order to pass them along to the
consumer.305 Environmentalists argue that GMOs will destroy
biodiversity and create super-insects and weeds that will cause
environmental degradation and contamination.0 6 But a pollu-
tion credit system would help internalize environmental degra-
dation by creating a market for "genetic contamination" credits
similar to air pollution credits.3 7 In the case of GMOs, envi-
ronmental contamination has occurred, but damage is difficult
to assess or value for a credit system. 08 An environmental im-
pact test prior to market release could provide information that
economists need to model potential damages, weigh the scien-
tific probability estimates, and come up with a reasonable credit
309price.
Another potential solution is a tradable or credit permit
system.310 Such a system would recognize the rights of future
generations to the world's natural resources. 31' Environmental
economists would include in their permit model the capture of
302. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 174-95 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
externalities).
305. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
306. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 165-69.
308. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
310. See, for example, the discussion regarding tradable permits or credits used
to regulate sulfur dioxide emissions, supra notes 167-68, 175-79 and accompanying
text.
311. The ICESCR says, that the right to food is to be achieved though the most




any effects that might be cumulative in nature, the costs of
which would then burden future generations.31 Because future
generations do not have current market power, the market does
not capture their interests.313 A human rights test would help
policymakers consider the rights of future generations to food
and a clean and livable environment. This test would help poli-
cymakers to evaluate market interventions for their ability to
capture current and cumulative externalities that would affect
both current and future generations. 314
An international body such as the WTO, WHO, or FAO can
provide guidelines for a credit system.315 The credit system
should be nationally based because it is likely that contamina-
tion would be localized.318  However, the WTO should create a
trade agreement in which states agree to be liable under the
WTO dispute resolution process for contamination that spreads
across international borders." 7 Nations should divide money
from the sale of tradable permits or credits into at least two
funds.318 One fund should be kept in a trust for clean-up projects
if damages occur across borders or for national ecological disas-
ters where recovery proves inadequate.3 9  The state or court
could then distribute the funds through the WTO or through the
courts once liability for an environmental accident is determined
and direct recovery is attempted. 32' Another fund could be set
up from the credits to help develop germ plasma 321 banks to pro-
tect biodiversity and the gene pool. 322 The purpose of these two
funds is directly linked to the protection of natural resources
and the gene pool. 32 3 The credit system recognizes the balance
that must be achieved between providing food to a hungry world
and protecting the environment by allowing tolerable levels of
312. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 158 and accompanying text
314. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
315. HALLMAN, supra note 52, at 7.
316. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text
321. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 46 and accompanying text
323. Permit funds should not be used to develop scientific understanding in
LDCs because such programs are not directly linked to potential environmental pol-
lution. Tax incentives might be used to encourage private public partnerships be-
tween businesses and LDCs in regards to research and development of plants and
traits suited to the needs of LDCs.
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pollution, much as is done with energy needs and pollution from
S324
coal.
F. THE NEED FOR FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE GMO MARKET
Intellectual property rights are a necessary market inter-
vention to achieving market efficiency.325 Markets may not ade-
quately support innovation unless there is a way to ensure re-
ward. 26 The Western system of intellectual property rights is
based on expert scientific knowledge, availability of a large capi-
tal outlay to achieve such protection, and the cultural standard
of individual reward for individual effort. This type of a system
is likely to fail in recognizing the innovative efforts of farmers
who have developed genetic material outside the framework of
western style scientific thought, who do not have the capital or
expertise to pursue patenting, and who are not predisposed to
the idea of individual reward for individual effort.3 27 Because
property rights are a necessary market intervention to encour-
age innovation, a human rights test, which provides structure
and limits to the system, will assist policymakers in balancing
the market's competing needs of rewarding innovation and pro-
tecting community knowledge with the traditions of farmers inLDCs. 328
A rigid western-style system of property rights ignores the
fundamental right to food and treats food as it would treat intel-
lectual property rights for computer software.3 2 ' The interna-
tional system of property rights regarding plant and animal ma-
terial for consumption as food should allow small farms
"breeder's rights" to use a patented seed as an initial source of
variation for one's own creation and a "farmer's privilege" to
propagate a protected seed line for the farmer's own use.330 In
addition, the U.N. should develop a program of technical assis-
tance, which increases the ability of farmers in LDCs to protect
their property rights and thereby inhibits western free-riders
from mining the LDCs for patents.33 ' Only through a flexible
324. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 174-91 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 174-91 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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system of property rights can policymakers ameliorate the prob-
lem of free-riders and maintain market incentive for innovation
while providing some protection for traditional cultural and
farm practices.
Intellectual property rights can be supportive of the goals of
the CPB. Article 11 of the CPB does not spell out a property
rights regime but provides a justification on which a system can
be built.3 3 Conversely, Articles 16 and 18 do not mandate tech-
nological transfer access to biological resources. 3 4 Ultimately,
as a practical matter, a strong intellectual property rights re-
gime will offer the greatest protection to an LDC to control the
uses of its resources.335 However, this protection will only come
about if western countries help LDCs increase their technical
expertise regarding intellectual property and enforcement, sim-
plify the process, and make it more economical.3 6
CONCLUSION
The GMO market has its shortfalls. Adoption of a human
rights test in the evaluation of GMO regulations is one tool with
which policymakers can assure consumers that not only market
factors are driving decision making. In addition, it brings struc-
ture to the thoughtful and rigorous consideration of important
human rights. The test is not necessarily a legal test to be ap-
plied by courts, but rather it is a preemptive attempt towards
favorably shaping GMO regulation based on a plurality of voices
including those who are underrepresented in the market, so
that the best, most equitable possible policy choice can be made.
332. See supra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 104.
334. See discussion supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 184-85. A strong intellectual property rights system allows
LDCs to create monetary value on their diverse natural resources. See generally
Plotkin, supra note 49 (arguing that extensive intellectual property rights are an
effective tool for developing countries to protect their environmental interests); see
generally WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING
GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1993) (arguing that con-
trolled exploitation of natural resources under an intellectual property rights regime
will ultimately lead to great environmental protections.) This value in the market
insures a level of protection, which is more secure than measures of protection that
are based on environmental protection for its own sake. See supra note 49 and ac-
companying text.
336. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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